Simultaneous with the bargaining process was the yearly legislative battle to fund Amtrak (including the provisions of any agreement) which continuously intensified and reached the critical stage-- involving middle of the night sessions of Congress--beginning on Sunday, November 9 and ending on November 13. For more on this important part of the story please see the President's Perspective.

This struggle with Amtrak has been one of the longest and hardest fought the BMWE has ever been in but because BMWE always moved aggressively, it was able to reach an agreement with Amtrak that provides its members with increases which are nearly identical to what its members on the national freight railroads (and PEB 234 recommended) received last year.

Between 1981 and July 1995, BMWE Amtrak workers earned up to 12% less than our members on the national freight roads as a result of a 1981 agreement in which BMWE members sacrificed increases in order to insure Amtrak's survival. As a result of the last round of bargaining, Amtrak workers were brought up to national freight rates in increments by July 1995. The moratorium expired on January 1, 1995, just as the national moratorium expired.

But Amtrak management simply refused to bargain with BMWE (or any other craft) since Section 6 Notices were served in November 1994. They made unrealistic proposals (like hiring halls) and were only willing to accept increases which provided half of the increase in the cost of inflation (the so-called Harris COLA). Amtrak stuck to these positions throughout the bargaining process despite the results of the national round culminating in agreement in September 1996.

At the conclusion of the national round, BMWE offered Amtrak the same inflation-maintenance package it gained nationally. Amtrak said "NO," saying they couldn't afford to pay it even while they publicly yielded to subsidies which would require no federal operational subsidy by the year 2002. When they approached Congress for appropriations, they didn't even ask for the increases for their work force which the national freight agreement provided our members nationally.

In July 1997, the National Mediation Board proffered arbitration to BMWE and Amtrak. In August President Clinton averted self-help by appointing a Presidential Emergency Board -- PEB 234. After several days of hearings, the members of PEB 234 considered the positions of BMWE and Amtrak and issued recommendations granting BMWE the national wage package and placing all other issues, including, but not limited to, health and welfare improvments, dental improvements, supplemental sickness improvments, off-track vehicle improvments, off-hour pay, meal and travel allowance improvements into binding arbitration. Although BMWE was extremely unhappy with these issues being placed into binding arbitration, we believed that the recommendations could provide the basis for reaching an agreement but Amtrak still refused to bargain, claiming it couldn't afford the package.

In an effort to avert a BMWE strike on October 22, 1997, and to seek some additional time to jump start stalled negotiations, Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater asked the BMWE for a one-week extension of the strike deadline. The BMWE agreed to his request and welcomed his involvement in the bargaining process which helped lead to the November 2 agreement.

Reaching agreement also required the intelligent use of strategy and tactics. BMWE leadership recognized that if it shut down Amtrak and all of the commuter lines that are dependent on Amtrak (SEPTA, NJT, LIRR, Chicago METRA and NICTA, Tri Counties in Florida, the Western Corridor, MBTA in Boston) it would lose key political support in Congress and would injure those who use the commuter lines which are not party to the dispute.

In an innovative move, the BMWE sought and reached agreement with all of the commuter roads outside of the Northeast and with SEPTA, LIRR and NJT to permit them to use the portions of Amtrak necessary for them to continue to provide service. BMWE received cooperation from most of the other crafts to allow those of their Amtrak members necessary to maintain service for NJT, LIRR and SEPTA to cross picket lines, so long as no Amtrak train (except those long distance trains that had been in transit prior to the strike to complete their trips) ran.

This different and somewhat controversial approach gained BMWE substantial good will not only from the general public but from the Clinton Administration and from members of Congress from both parties. When Amtrak balked at developing a plan to permit the commuters to run, Secretary Slater involved himself directly both in seeing that a plan was developed and ultimately in resolving the dispute between BMWE and Amtrak. The White House also provided critical, skillful and invaluable assistance and over a two-week period, the BMWE was able to reach agreement first to allow SEPTA, NJT and LIRR to run and then on a contract with Amtrak.