By Jon Bloom Forty years ago this fall,
American labor beat back the strongest employer political offensive since the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley law eleven years earlier. In the 1958 mid-term elections, six states
including California and Ohio considered "right-to-work" referenda that would
have outlawed the union shop under Taft-Hartley's notorious section 14-b. But in a
campaign resembling the recent one against the "Paycheck Protection" proposal in
California, in 1958 union people and their allies turned the tide, defeating right-to-work
in five of the six states, sweeping into office a new generation of pro-labor U.S.
Senators, and setting the stage for the Democratic recapture of the White House from the
Republicans in 1960.
Business and Republicans Set out to "Curb Labor"
Taft-Hartley's section 14-b permitted states to enact "right-to-work" laws,
within one decade after most Southern and a number of Plains states had outlawed the union
shop. In 1956 and 1957, organized business and its Republican Party allies launched
efforts to enact right-to-work in northern and Midwestern states where unions were
strongest. In 1957, the Indiana state legislature passed right-to-work, and a similar bill
almost passed in Connecticut.
In early 1958, business coalitions gathered money and signatures to place referenda on
the Fall 1958 ballots in California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Ohio, and Washington. The
grassroots-sounding "Ohioans for the Right to Work," was actually organized by
the Chamber of Commerce, General Electric, Timken Roller Bearing, Armco Steel and other
corporations. But some early polls showed majority support for the referenda. Business
Week boasted that unions were on the defensive in this latest major push to
"curb labor."
"Industrial Majority Rule"
The recently merged AFL-CIO and its new political arm, the Committee on Political
Education (COPE) responded with massive registration and fund-raising drives, and a
defense of the union shop as "nothing more than industrial majority rule,"
thereby linking it to core American values.
In Colorado, the AFL-CIO noticed that surveys showed that many of those expressing
sympathy for "right-to-work" did not know what the term meant. The Federation
organized a citizens committee against right-to-work to communicate to the state's voters,
and in the words of Colorado AFL-CIO President George Cavendish, chose a calm educational
approach, "rather than running around screaming and having cartoons showing labor in
chains and that sort of thing."
In Ohio, the state AFL and CIO, though not yet merged, formed a special organization,
"United Organized Labor of Ohio," to fight the right-to work proposal. It
registered 200,000 new voters, the majority as Democrats, including 40,000 Black voters
registered in a special Operation Registration drive coordinated with the Ohio NAACP.
COPE made a particular effort to educate union members on how right-to-work would
weaken their organizations, and as a result COPE raised more voluntary contributions from
union members in 1958, a "mid-term" election, than it had in the Presidential
election year of 1956.
A Sweeping Victory
In November, right-to-work was decisively defeated in four of the six state referenda,
and narrowly defeated in another. In addition, according to political scientist Alan
Draper's history of COPE, "Democratic Party candidates reaped the harvest of COPE's
work."
In Colorado, the vote was 319,000 to 200,000, or 61% to 39%, rejecting right-to-work.
In Washington, a strongly unionized state with a well-organized COPE, the vote was
similar: 600,000 to 340,000, against right-to-work. In Idaho, a state with less than
one-quarter of the work force unionized, right-to-work was defeated 121,000 to 118,000, or
51% to 49%.
Ohio rejected right-to-work by a landslide 2 million to 1.1 million, or 63% to 37%.
Republican Senator John Bricker, who had not lost a statewide election in 22 years, went
down to defeat, as did incumbent Republican Governor William O'Neill, and the Democrats
captured the state legislature.
In California, right-to-work lost by 3 million to 2 million, or 60% to 40%. An increase
of 300,000 registered voters resulted in a record turnout, and William Knowland, the
former Senate Minority leader who resigned from Congress to run for Governor and,
according to Draper, "made the alleged power of unions the dominant theme of his
campaign," went down to defeat.
Only in Kansas did right-to-work forces win, by a vote of 400,000 to 300,000. Kansas
had only 130,000 union members. Perhaps more important, the pro right-to-work campaign was
well financed by Boeing, Cessna, and other corporations in the state, and over a
three-year period it mobilized business people, produced displays at all 50 Kansas county
fairs, produced three films, and blitzed the media in the final week of the 1958 campaign.
Reaping the Harvest
Victorious COPE-endorsed candidates included new U.S. Senators Philip Hart of Michigan,
Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, Vance Hartke of Indiana, and Edmund Muskie of Maine, all of
whom had distinguished and pro-labor records in the years to come. Mobilizing members,
working with allies, and educating on the issues, labor in 1958 stopped
"right-to-work" from spreading and elected its own champions to State houses and
Congress. James L. McDevitt, COPE Director at the time, exulted: "More than anything
else, this campaign proved that when labor is aroused and forgets its differences it in
turn can arouse the people."
Jon Bloom is editor of the New York Labor History Association News Service. |